Hume as a Trope Nominalist

I will give this paper at the panel on nominalism and relations in Hume Conference, Calgary, July 18-22, 2012.

Why Hume Cannot Be a Realist

Revised version of the paper that I gave in Belief and Doubt in Hume conference in Prague, September 2011.

In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 (1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in particular) and believing in the existence of Real entities. The problem with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various Realist ways to avoid this problem do not work. So this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism.

Comments on 'Is Hume a Projectivist on Absolute Necessity' by Thomas Holden

The full version of my comment paper on Thomas Holden's paper at Hume 2011 Conference, University of Edinburgh, 19/7/2011.

A Third Type of Distinction in the Treatise

In this paper, I argue that Hume's system in the Treatise is compatible with a third kind of distinction besides real and rational distinction. There is no proper term for this third kind of distinction in the late Scholastic and Rationalist debate on distinctions, nor in Hume’s own writings. So a more anachronistic term must be found for it. That is David Lewis' slightly modified partial distinction, which means that if A and B are partially distinct, they are not identical but share parts. I show that according to Hume's metaphysics of space, perceptions of extension consist of unextended coloured or tangible points. As these points are the ultimate proper parts of perceptions of extension and their own improper parts, the perceptions of extension and points have common parts. They are not identical because a perception of extension is not the points that compose it; it is these points arranged in a certain manner. Therefore, the perceptions of extension are partially distinct from the points. That Hume's system is compatible with partial distinction implies that it also allows of necessary connections between distinct perceptions.

Programme: Hume's Metaphysics and Humean Metaphysics

An international conference at the University of Tampere, Finland, June 20-22

Humen teoria avaruuden ymmärtämisestä

Paper on Hume's metaphysics of space given at the annual conference of the Finnish Philosophical Society, Uni. Turku, January 10, 2011, in Finnish.

The Problem of Trope Individuation

The draft of the paper co-authored with Dr Markku Keinänen (Turku, Finland), please do not quote without permission.

We defend a trope theory, Strong Nuclear Theory developed from Peter Simons' Nuclear theory, for E.J. Lowe's dilemma against trope theories. The first horn of this dilemma is that if tropes are identity dependent on substances, a vicious circularity threatens trope theories because they must admit that substances are identity dependent on their constituent tropes. According to the second horn, if the trope theorist claims that tropes are identity independent, she faces two insurmountable difficulties. (1) It is hard to understand the ontological dependence of tropes on substances. (2) The identity-conditions of tropes cannot be determinate, which threatens the determination of the identity-conditions of substances. Our reply to the first horn of Lowe's dilemma is to deny the identity dependence of tropes. Yet we can avoid the second horn because our theory can explain the ontological dependence of tropes on substances and the fully-determined identity-conditions of both tropes and substances.

Hume's Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties

I gave this paper in Nordic Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy 2011 (Reykjavik, Iceland) and at Hume's Metaphysics and Humean Metaphysics (University of Tampere, 20-22/6/2011). Draft, please do not quote without permission. Final version forthcoming in Metaphysica 1/2012.

In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in T 1.4.3.7 or 1.4.5.5. According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. On my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory of sense-perception and his Copy Principle. I will also show why Hume's argument should be seen as relevant nowadays. David Lewis and his followers in metaphysics continue Hume's line of thinking in this respect, which is opposed by power ontologists (Brian Ellis, Stephen Mumford), for example.

Persistence of Simple Substances

Co-authored with Dr Markku Keinänen, University of Turku, Finland; penultimate draft; published online in Metaphysica 13 May 2010

In this paper, we argue for a novel 3D'ist solution to the problem of persistence, i.e., cross-temporal identity. We restrict the discussion of persistence to simple substances, which do not have other substances as their parts. The account of simple substances employed in the paper is a trope-nominalist Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT), which develops Peter Simons' trope nominalism. Regarding the distinction between 3D and 4D, we follow Michael Della Rocca's formulation, in which 3D explains persistence in virtue of same entities and 4D in virtue of distinct entities (temporal parts). SNT is a 3D'ist position because it accounts for the persistence of simple substances in virtue of diachronically identical “nuclear” tropes. The nuclear tropes of a simple substance are necessary for it and mutually rigidly dependent but distinct. SNT explains qualitative change by tropes that are contingent to a simple substance. We show that it avoids the standard problems of 3D: temporal relativization of ontic predication, Bradley's regress, and coincidence, fission and fusion cases. The temporal relativization is avoided because of the analysis of temporary parts that SNT gives in terms of temporal sub-location, which is atemporal part-whole relation.

Hume on the Individuality of Complex Perceptions

A revised version of the paper I gave at 2010 Hume Conference in Antwerp, Belgium.

In this paper, I defend the compositionally realist interpretation of Hume's complex perceptions in Treatise 1, exemplified by Don Garrett, against the compositionally nihilist account by Donald L.M. Baxter. According to the compositionally realist reading, Hume thinks that there are complex perceptions that are wholes in the sense of further individuals to the simple perceptions which are their ultimate proper parts. Compositionally nihilist account denies this because it renounces the literal existence of complex perceptions as individuals. The existence, composition and identity of complex perceptions is a fundamental issue in understanding Hume's ontology (of perceptions). I show that the compositionally realist interpretation of Treatise 1 and the Abstract should be preferred because it explains the text of these two works better. (1) There is strong textual evidence for it. (2) The passages that support compositional nihilism create no problem for compositional realism. (3) There is a difficult dilemma against the former interpretation stemming from Hume's view on identity at a time and his metaphysics of space.

Hume's Scepticism and Realism

penultimate draft, forthcoming in BJHP

In this paper, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume’s attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in the existence of Real entities. The defended reading is thus a sceptical and Realist interpretation of Hume. As such, it belongs to the class of what can be called no-single-Hume interpretations (Richard H. Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L.M. Baxter), by contrast to single-Hume readings, which include Realist (naturalist, New Humean) and the traditional Reid-Green interpretation (i.e. Hume believes that there are no Real entities). Hume’s distinction between the domains of philosophy and everyday life, which is argued to be epistemological, is employed in order to reconcile his scepticism with his naturalism and constructive science of human nature. The paper pays special attention to the too much neglected second profound argument against the senses in Part 1, Section 12 of Hume’s first Enquiry and the corresponding argument in Section 4, Part 4, Book 1 of the Treatise.

Hume's Scepticism and Realism - His Two Profound Arguments against the Senses in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

My dissertation published by Tampere University Press, 2007

The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking.
A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his judgment on Metaphysical Realism, whereas as a common man he firmly believes in the existence of mind-independent, external, and continuous entities. Therefore Hume does not have any one position; accordingly, a form of “no one Hume” interpretation (Richard Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L.M. Baxter) is argued for in the book.
The key point in this distinction is the temporal difference between Hume’s philosophical and everyday views. It is introduced in order to avoid attributing a conscious contradiction to him (a problem which has not attracted enough attention in the literature). The method of the work is modelled on Peter Millican’s work on Hume and induction. The approach to the main problem is to study the two “profound” arguments against the senses that Hume presents in the Section 12 of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). These arguments are first reconstructed in detail resulting in Millican-type diagrams of them and then Hume’s endorsement of them is established on the basis of the diagrams. The first profound argument concludes that Metaphysical Realism and thus any Realistic theory of perception is unjustified as well as the existence of God and the soul. The second argument goes further having first conceptual conclusion: the very notions of Real entitity, material substance, and bodies are completely out of the reach of the faculty of understanding. Therefore they ought to be rejected according to Hume. This is a consequence of the consistent use of the Humean faculty of reason: idea-analysis and inductive inference. The second profound argument thus concludes that believing in Metaphysical Realism is inconsistent with the rational attitude that is to refrain from this belief. Hence, if we attributed both of them to Hume, we would end up with a great philosopher who embraces a manifest contradiction.
The study is finished by arguing that this sceptical and Metaphysically Realistic interpretation concurs well with (1) Hume’s professed Academical philosophy and (2) project of the science of human nature. (1) According to Hume, Academical philosophy is in the first place diffidence, modesty, and uncertainty including suspension on certain issues. Secondly, it is restriction of the range of topics for which experience can provide a standard of truth. This kind of empiricist epistemological realism is coherent with the sceptical attitude on Metaphysical Realism because the latter does not rule out inter-subjective consensus on what we experience. (2) Suspension of judgment on Metaphysical Realism coheres with the mind-dependency of the objects of Hume’s science of human nature: the understanding, passions, morals, aesthetics, politics, and the human culture in all of its manifestations.
Although the study takes the first Enquiry to be Hume’s authorised word on the understanding, his juvenile work A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is argued to support this “no one Hume” interpretation. Hume’s other works are also discussed when needed.

Hume on the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities

penultimate draft of the chapter in Vanishing Matter (Routledge, November 2010)

Body Vanishes - Hume's and Berkeley's Abstraction Arguments against the Early Modern Conceptions of Material Substance

draft only

The Materialist of Malmesbury and the Experimentalist of Edinburgh. Hume¿ S and Hobbes¿ Conception of Imagination Compared

The penultimate draft of the article that I wrote as a graduate student.